The paper analyzes the e¤ect of the generosity of the welfare state on the skill composition of immigrants. We develop a parsimonious model in which the e¤ect of an increase in the generosity (and taxes) of the welfare state on the skill composition of immigrants under free migration is negative. The reason is that welfare state bene…ts attract unskilled migrants because they contribute to tax revenues less than what they gain from bene…ts; and this generosity works to deter skilled immigrants, because they contribute in taxes more than in bene…ts. In sharp contrast, the e¤ect of an increase in the generosity (and taxes) of the welfare state on the skill composition of migrants Tel-Aviv University y Tel aviv University, Cornell University, CEPR, NBER. 1 is positive if migration is controlled by policy. Being net contributors to the welfare state, skilled migrants can help …nance a more generous welfare-state system; thus, they are preferred by the policy maker over unskilled migrants. We take the prediction of the model to cross-sectional data on source-host, OECD-EU country pairs in the year 2000. The identi…cation strategy is to use the decomposition the source-host country pairs into two groups: one group, a "free migration" group, source-host country pairs within the EU, and another group, "policy-controlled migration" group, the pairs from non-EU countries into the EU. We …nd evidence in support of the predictions of the parsimonious model, that the generosity of the welfare state adversely a¤ects the skill-composition of migrants under free migration; but it exerts a more positive e¤ect under controlled migration, relative to the free migration regime..
Introduction
The paper addresses the e¤ect of the generosity of the welfare state on the skill composition of immigrants.
Free migration has been one of the important qualities of the integration of Europe into the European Union. Freedom of movement, and the ability to reside and work anywhere within the EU, are one of the fundamental rights to which member states of the EU are obligated towards each other. 1 1 Despite the legal provision for the free movement of labor among EU-15 (the old member countries), the level of cross-border labor mobility is low. Reasons cited for this include the existence of legal and administrative barriers, the lack of familiarity with other European languages, moving costs, ine¢ cient housing markets, the limited portability of In contrast, labor mobility into the EU members states from non EU states, is still restricted by national policies. This di¤erence in policy regimes across EU and non EU states provides an opportunity to test theory predictions about key di¤erences between free and policy-controlled migration.
The di¤erences in migration policies are also tightly linked to the generosity of the welfare state. For example, an impetus for relaxing migration restrictions by EU member states, towards non-EU countries, is that birth rates dwindle and life expectancy goes on rising. Consequently, EU native born population is both declining and ageing. A declining productive workforce needed to …nance the increased economic burden of the costly welfare-state institutions, puts a downward pressure on output growth. One alternative is to adopt more liberal migration policies, especially towards skilled migrants, solidifying the …nancial soundedness of the welfare state. Unskilled migrants, in contrast, which are usually heavy users of the bene…ts of the welfare state, may put further strains on the welfare state. Therefore, voters in an ageing welfare state may opt for a migration policy which will be more liberal and also upgrade the skill composition of migration. 2 pension rights, problems with the international recognition of professional quali…cations and the lack of transparency of job openings. The expansion of the EU to 25 member states in May 2004, was accompanied by concerns over the possibility of a wave of migrationparticularly of the low-skilled -from the then ten new member states to the EU-15. 2 The Financial Times puts it sucsinctly: "Over the next 10 years Germany faces a demographic disaster and immigrantion could be part of the solution. As the birth rate dwindles and life expectancy goes on rising, the country's population is both declining and ageing. Unless this double-whammy is confronted head-on, the economy will collapse under the weight of an expensive welfare state that lacks the productive workforce to …nance it. Something has to be done -and fast -as Germany's leaders and parts of
We present a parsimonious model which predicts that the generosity of the welfare state serves as a magnet to unskilled migrants, but as a deterrent to skilled migration. Furthermore, voters in relatively more generous welfare states are more likely to opt for migration policies that are more lax towards skilled migration and more tight towards unskilled migration. As a result, countries with more generous welfare systems are expected to have their skill composition of migrants biased towards unskilled migration, relative to countries with less generous welfare systems, if migration is free. The opposite is true when migration is controlled by national policies. Countries with more generous welfare systems are expected to have their skill composition of migrants biased towards skilled migration, if its voters can restrict migration, relative to countries with less generous welfare systems.
In this paper we also confront the predictions of our theory with empirical evidence. We consider the generosity of the welfare state as an exogenous variable, and study the e¤ect of this variable on the skill composition of immigration stocks, in the cases of free and controlled migration. The EU provides a unique testing ground for the predictions of our parsimonious model, as there is more or less free migration among EU member states, whereas each EU member decides on whether, and to what extent, to restrict migration from the rest of the world.
We employ cross-sectional data from 14 EU countries and other 12 OECD its economic elite are …nally realising. And now they have come up with a last-ditch plan to avert meltdown: a plan designed to harness the untapped resources of its migrant community, whose youth, ambition and skills Germany needs to keep its economic engine running." (FT June 27, 2008) . See also Brucker et al (2001) .
countries in the year 2000. 3 We form source-host pairs of countries where only the EU countries (plus Norway and Switzerland) serve as host countries, whereas all the 26 countries in the sample serve as source countries. The identi…cation strategy is a decomposition of the source-host pairs into two groups:
a "free-migration" group (source-host pairs within the EU, plus Norway and Switzerland) and a "policy-controlled" group of countries (source-host pairs where the host countries are the same as in the former group, and the source countries are from the remaining (non EU) countries). We assume, plausibly, that this free-restricted migration decomposition, which has its origin in the integration process in Europe that started in the 1950s, could not have as one of its determinants, the eventual stock of the migrants in the EU states, some 50 years later.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a parsimonious model of the welfare state and migration, divided into two alternative migrationregimes. In the …rst regime, political-economy equilibrium of migration is determined by host country, capturing the interests of the skilled and unskilled workers, as voters; in the second migration regime migration is determined by the choice of potential migrants in the source country. Section 3 discusses empirical evidence from the literature literature, focusing on the interaction between international migration and the welfare state.In section 4 we confront the parsimonious model's predictions with international cross section data. Section 5 presents robustness tests, and Section 6 concludes. 3 We restrict attention to OECD countries in order to get a relatively homogeneous classi…cation of skill levels.
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Assume a Cobb-Douglas production function, with two labor inputs, skilled and unskilled 4 :
where, Y is the GDP, A denotes a Hicks-neutral productivity parameter, and L i denotes the input of skilled and unskilled labor i, where i = s; u.
The competitive wages of skilled and unskilled labor are, respectively
Aggregate labor supply, for skilled and unskilled workers, respectively, is
given by:
There is a continuum of workers, where the number of native born is normalized to 1; s denotes the share of native born skilled in the total native born labor supply; denotes the share of skilled migrants in the total number of migrants; denotes the total number of migrants; and l i is the labor supply of an individual with skill level i,i = s; u.
Total population (native born and immigrants) is:
We specify a simple welfare-state system which levies a proportional labor income tax of the rate , with the revenues redistributed equally to all residents (native born and migrants alike), as a demogrant, b; per capita.
The demogrant captures not only a cash transfer but also outlays on public services such as education, health, etc., that are distributed to all workers, regardless of their contribution to the tax revenues.
The government budget constraint:
The utility function for skill-type i is:
where c i denotes consumption of an individual with skill level i, and " > 0.
The individual budget constraint is:
Individual utility maximization yields the labor supply equation:
It is then straightforward to calculate the equilibrium wages:
where: b
(1 )
To guarantee that w s > w u , we assume:
Policy-Controlled Migration
Assume that the host country faces a perfectly elastic supply of migrants of each one of the two skill types, so that host-country migration policy is the sole determinant of migration ‡ows. The policy is determined by the majority of the voters in the host country .We assume that the policy decisions on the tax rate, ; and the total volume of migration, ; are exogenous. We do this in order to focus the analysis on a single endogenous policy variable, the skill composition of immigrants, : Note that once ; ; are determined, then the demogrant, b, is given by the budget constraint; we thus denote the demogrant b as b( ; ); where the exogenous variable is suppressed.
The indirect utility of an individual with skill level i is given by:
Di¤erentiating Equation (10) , and employing the envelope theorem, yields 5 :
Thus, a change in the share of skilled migrants in the total number of migrants, , a¤ects the utility level through two channels. First, an increase in raises average labor productivity and thereby tax revenues. This, in turn, raises the demogrant, b. Second, an increase in , which raises the supply of skilled labor relative to the supply of unskilled labor depresses the skilled-premium in the labor market, w s w u .
We assume that only the native born is eligible to vote about migration policy, as the new migrants are yet to enter the country after the vote is taken. 5 We assume that second order condition for maximization holds.
If the decisive voter is unskilled, both of the above e¤ects are positive. Thus, an unskilled voter would like to set the skill-composition of migrants at a corner, = 1:
If the decisive voter is skilled, however, the two e¤ects are con ‡icting: an increase in raises b but lowers w s . Thus the derivative in equation (12) is equated to zero by the skilled worker at a level of below one. This means that the share of skilled migrants preferred by a skilled voter must be lower than the share of skilled immigrants preferred by an unskilled voter. De…ning i as the share of skilled immigrants most preferred by an individual with skill level i in the host country, i = s; u;we get:
Our goal is to …nd the e¤ect of the change in the generosity of the welfare state on the migration policy concerning . The generosity of the welfare state, captured by the demogrant, b, depends on the tax rate, (as the economy is assumed to be on the "right side" of the La¤er curve). We can readily show that:
This means that an exogenous increase in the tax rate, , would leave the skilled-only migration policy unchanged, if the decisive voter is an unskilled worker. It is simply because the unskilled median voter prefers only skilled immigrants regardless of the level of . If, however, the decisive voter is a skilled worker, an exogenous increase in the tax rate, , must change the policy concerning the skill-composition of migrants in the direction toward a larger share of skilled immigrants. The reason is that when the tax rates rise, the redistribution burden upon a skilled decisive voter is increases, and allowing an additional skilled migrant can ease this …scal burden.
Free Migration
Assume that no restrictions are placed on migration by the policy makers in the host country. In choosing whether to migrate or not, a potential migrant of skill i compares his prospect utility, V i , in the migration destination, to the reservation utility, denoted by u i in the source country. There is a continuum of would be migrants, di¤erent with respect to the reservation utility level in the source country. This heterogeneity of reservation utilities in the source country stems for di¤erent traits of the potential migrants (e.g., family size, age, moving costs, forms of portable pensions, housing, cultural ties, etc.). Thus the host country faces an upward sloping supply curve, S(V i ) of potential migrants from the source country, for each skill level.
Let m s be the number of skilled migrants, and m u is the number of unskilled migrants. The proportion of skilled migrants, , is uniquely de…ned by:
The indirect utility function in the host country, no longer dependent on , is rewritten as:
The following equations determine, for each , the cut-o¤ levels of the reservation utilities, u s ( ) and u u ( ):
As the number of migrants of each skill level is determined by the supply of migrants then
We now turn to …nd the e¤ect of the generosity of the welfare state on the skill mixture of the immigrants. To simplify the analysis we abstract from the general-equilibrium e¤ects of migration rates and labor supplies. 7 Hence, an increase in raises the demogrant, b, but lowers the net wage, w i (1 ) : For skill migrants the fall in net wage outweighs the increase in the demogrant.
Thus, an increase in reduces the well-being of skill workers. Consequently, an increase in reduces the cut-o¤ reservation utility of skilled migrants, u s ( ) : As a result, those skill migrants with reservation utilities between the old one the new cuto¤ levels will choose not to migrate. The opposite holds true for unskilled migrants. Thus the generosity of the welfare state under free migration deters skilled migrants and attracts unskilled migrants; thereby tilting the skill composition of migration towards unskilled migrants.
We show in the appendix that:
In sum, an exogenous increase of the tax rate, , deters skilled immigrants and attracts unskilled immigrants. An increase in raises bene…ts and lowers disposable private income. Consequently, among the net contributors to the welfare state, skilled migrants, those with high reservation wage decide not to migrate; among those who are potentially net bene…ciary from the welfare state, the unskilled workers, infra-marginally change their decision in favor of migration.
Empirical Evidence on Welfare Migration
The existing literature addresses the issue of how the welfare-state generosity works as a magnet to migrants --the "welfare migration" phenomenon. He …nds signi…cant welfare induced migration, particularly for high school dropouts. Borjas (1999) , who uses the same data set …nds that low skilled migrants are much more heavily clustered in high bene…t states, in compar- 8 Brueckner ( courage the migration of both skilled and unskilled migrants. However, the unskilled are motivated by social expenditure much more than the skilled.
Thus they claim that the skill composition of migrants is adversely e¤ected by the welfare-state bene…ts.
Recall that our parsimonious model predicts a di¤erential e¤ect on migration and its skill composition, depending on whether migration is free or policy-controlled. Therefore, in order to obtain unbiased estimates of the generosity of the welfare state on migration (and on its skill composition), one must control for the migration regime (free versus controlled). This means that the studies of migration between states within the U.S. (such as Borjas (1999), for example), which are evidently con…ned to a single migration regime (namely, free migration), can produce unbiased results. Other studies that employ samples that are con…ned to the policy-controlled migration regime, but at the same time employ a model of the migrants'choice, whether to migrate or not, and if so where to migrate to, are evidently inconsistent. In this case the estimates convey little information on the migrant choices (and, therefore on the welfare state as a magnet to unskilled migrants). Rather, the samle conveys information on the migration policy choices by the host country. Those studies that refer to both migration regimes, without controlling for them, are not easily interpretable because they convey a mixture of information on migration policies in the host country, and on the individual migrant's migration choices in the source country. 10 The data used in Section 4 is extracted from the same database which is used in 
Empirical Analysis 4.1 Testable Hypotheses
There are two main predictions of the parsimonious model, which we like to test. First, if migration is free, the generosity of the welfare state has an adverse e¤ect on the skill composition of migrants. A typical skilled migrant is more likely to move to a less generous welfare state; and move to a less generous host country with a lower tax rate rather than to a more generous country with a higher tax rate, other things being equal. Second, in the case that the skill composition of migration is policy-controlled, then the more generous is the welfare state, the more the skill composition of migrants is tilted towards skilled migrants.
As explained before, both results hinge on the redistributive aspects of the welfare state. Under free migration, equilibrium migration re ‡ects (among others) the choice of the migrants. Thus, a generous welfare state generating a …scal burden on skilled immigrants, is a deterrent for skilled migration. In the policy-controlled migration regime, however, the interest of the nativeborn in the host country, as is re ‡ected in the voting equilibrium, are at play.
Fiscal burden associated with the generosity of the welfare state, which falls on skilled native born, induces this interest group to endorse higher rates of skilled migration. The unskilled native born is in favor of maximum level of skilled migration, both for redistributive reasons and for labor complementarity reasons.
Formally, an increase in the generosity of the welfare state, as captured by the tax rate, , adversely a¤ects the skill composition of migrants, in the free-migration regime, that is
An increase in the generosity of the welfare state has a more pronounced e¤ect on the share of skilled migrants of total migrants when the migrationregime is policy-controlled, that is,
Denote by F and R , respectively, the skill composition of migrants in free migration regime and the policy-controlled regime. Consequently, we expect
Identi…cation Strategy
To confront the prediction of the parsimonious model with a cross section data of source-host (developed) country pairs, we decompose the sample into two groups. The …rst group contains source-host pairs of countries which enable free mobility of labor among themselves. They also prohibit any kind of discrimination between native born and migrants, regarding labor market accessibility and welfare-state bene…ts eligibility. These are 16 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, U.K., Norway and Switzerland. The data for this group, therefore, records bilateral migration stock for any pair of these countries.
well as by the considerations of the immigrant who considers other alternative host countries. Nevertheless, we expect the political economy consideration to be more dominant in restricted migration regimes than in free migration regimes. Similarly, we expect the considerations of the immigrants regarding alternative host countries to be more dominant in free migration regimes than in restricted ones.
The second group includes source-host pairs of countries, within which the source country residents cannot necessarily move freely into either of the host country without any restriction. The host countries are the same 16
countries from the …rst group; the source countries are 10 developed nonEuropean countries: U.S., Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Israel, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea and Singapore.
This decomposition is key to the identi…cation strategy. It enables us to plausibly assume that migration is free among the 16 countries of the …rst group, and is e¤ectively restricted by policy controls with respect to migrants from source countries of the second group. It is plausible to assume that the categorizing of both groups is exogenous to our dependent variable, the skill composition of immigrants. Thus we can identify the differential e¤ect of the generosity of the welfare state on the skill composition of immigrants across the two groups (the "free migration" group and the "policy-restricted migration" group) in an unbiased way.
The reason that it is safe to assume that this decomposition is exogenous to thee dependent variable, th skill composition of immigrants, is that the That is, citizens can move freely between member states to live, work, study or retire in another country. Such freedom of movement also entails the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the member states as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment. Austria, Sweden and Finland joined in 1995. These countries together form the EU-15 (or, the "old members states").
12 12 The accession treaties normally allow for the introduction of 'transitional measures'.
For instance, transitional periods of 6 years, postponing free labor mobility were introduced with respect to Greece, Spain and Portugal. The transitional measures obliges the member states to declare whether they will open up their labor markets for workers from the newly accessed countries, or keep restrictions in place for several (limited) years. In
The European Economic Area (EEA) came into being on January 1, 1994.
The contracting parties to the EEA agreement are Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway -and the EU Member States along with the European Community.
Switzerland is not part of the EEA. However, Switzerland is linked to the European Union by bilateral agreements. The EEA as well as the Switzerland bilateral agreements with the EU are based on the same "four freedoms" as the European Community, which includes the free mobility of labor and equal treatment clauses. 
The Econometric Model
We specify the source-host pair migration stock by the following equation: Note that s;h re ‡ects some omitted variables which are skill independent. In order to avoid the skill-independent-omitted-variable bias, we de…ne a skill-di¤erences model (a version of di¤erence-in-di¤erence model), by subtracting the two equations in (18):
where is the skill-di¤erences operator.
The dependent variable, m, can be considered as a measure for the skill composition of immigrants. The skill-di¤erences model, (19) , estimates therefore relative e¤ects of the regressors over m. The higher m is, the more upgraded is the skill composition the immigrants. Hence, a positive estimation of a certain coe¢ cient indicates a positive e¤ect on the skill composition measure of the immigrants, and vice versa.
14 An important statistical feature of the model is that it eliminates part of the error term, s;h . Any variable whose impact on migration is skill invariant, is canceled out. Additionally, by the inclusion of past migration stocks in X s;h we are able to account for key time invariant e¤ects.
Note that the e¤ect of on F is captured in the above equation by the coe¢ cient 2 . Therefore, the null hypothesis describing the e¤ect of on F becomes 2 < 0:Also, the e¤ect of on R is captured by the coe¢ cient 2 + 3 . Therefore the null hypothesis describing the the e¤ect of on
14 Naturally the estimation of can be obtained directly from (18) , by estimating each skill-dependent equation separately. As all skill-dependent equations in (18) have the same determinants, the coe¢ cients are simply the respective di¤erence of the separated estimation, h and l . However, extracting the estimation for from the DD model, (19) , enables us to directly test the signi…cance of the coe¢ cients which are related to the di¤erences in the levels of the explanatory variables.
A potential endogeneity problem, between the level of bene…ts in the host country, B h , and the skill composition of the migrants, m s;h , may arise, because skill immigrants can in ‡uence the political economic equilibrium level of bene…ts. 15 One way go around this problem is to take the average level of bene…ts over a long, pre-2000, period (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) ), as we indeed do.
Recall that we also control for past migration stock rate (in 1990). Thus only migration between 1990-2000 is to be explained by the lagged bene…t variable, a predetermined variable. Importantly, in addition, we also run IV estimation, using the legal origin in the host country (English, Scandinavian, or French-German) as instrument. The legal origin, a century old construct, was put in place without having the 2000 migration in mind. The legal origin is however, closely linked to national attitudes towards the generosity of the welfare state, and its institutional setups. It is therefore likely to be strongly correlated with B h .
We also provide several robustness estimations, including additional variables like distance, common language and others. The …rst null hypothesis, is that 2 < 0. It captures the migrant choices in the free migration regime. Indeed, the coe¢ cient is negative and signi…cant in all four regressions. That is, the generosity of the welfare state adversely a¤ects the skill composition of migrants in the free migration regime. The The second null hypothesis is that 3 > 0. It indicates the considerations of the host country's voters in policy controlled migration regimes.
Data Description

Main Findings
Indeed, the coe¢ cient is positive and signi…cant in all four regressions. That is, the e¤ect of the generosity of the welfare state on the skill composition of migrants is more pronounced in the policy-controlled migration regime.
The magnitude of the coe¢ cient is even higher in the IV regressions than the OLS regressions. Again, whether we include the full set of the variables in X s;h in the regressions (columns 2 and 4) or not (columns 1 and 3) does not seem to have much of an e¤ect on the magnitude of the coe¢ cient.
Turning to the other control variables, X s;h , the e¤ect of low (high) skilled migration stock rate in 1990 on the skill-composition of migration in 2000 is negative (positive) and signi…cant, in the free migration regime. An interpretation of this result is that in the free-migration regime there is an inertia over time for each skilled group of migrants. More unskilled migrants bring about further waves of unskilled migrants; and similarly, more skilled migrants bring about further waves of skilled migrants.
In the policy controlled migration regime, past migration of the unskilled increases the skill composition of immigrants in 2000 (past skilled migration increases the skill composition of immigrants in 2000, but less than in the free migration regime). The interpretation of this result, consistent with our model, is that having initially (i.e., in 1990) a large stock of unskilled migrants, which poses a …scal burden on the welfare state, induces its voters to opt for more skilled migrants in order to ease the burden. This explanation is supported in columns 2 and 4, where we account for the quantity of highlow skilled voters ratio, in the host countries. One can see that as this ratio is higher, the skill composition of immigrants is lower. Clearly, this outcome is in line with our model, wherein s < u .
Robustness Tests
First we replicate Table 1 with respect to the medium-skilled versus the low- As can be seen, the coe¢ cient of welfare bene…ts, for free migration regimes, is negative and signi…cant (in the second column, however, it is signi…cant only at 13%). The coe¢ cient of welfare bene…ts in policy controlled regimes is signi…cantly higher (again, with the exception of the second column).
We now extend the main speci…cation so as to account for standrd variables used in international immigration examinations. We include a dummy variable, accounting for common language between any source-host pairs, the log value of the great circle distance, in miles, between all source-host pairs, Again, the results are very similar to the ones presented in Table 1 , where the IV estimations pronounc our theory predictions even more.
Migration is often viewed as an economic force, which can mitigate the …scal burden induced by the process of aging. The reason is that an in ‡ow of young working age immigrants may slow down population aging and help paying for social security. However, on the other hand, because immigrants often have low education and high fertility rates, their net …scal impact may be costly rather than bene…cial. Storesletten (2000) and Lee and Miller (2000) calibrate a general equilibrium overlapping generations model to investigates whether a reform of immigration policies could resolve the …scal problems associated with aging. Storesletten …nds that selective immigration policies, involving increased in ‡ow of working-age high and medium-skilled immigrants, can remove the need for a future …scal reform. Lee and Miller, on the other hand, base their conclusion on that immigrants have lower education and higher fertility rates than that of the native born population. Thus if more immigrants are admitted into the economy, they will ease temporarily the projected …scal burden associated with the retirement of the baby boomers. But the overall …scal consequences are relatively small.
Providing evidence on whether immigrants pay their way in the welfarestate is addressed in a series of in ‡uential paper by Borjas (1991 Borjas ( , 1994 Borjas ( , 1996 . Sadka (2000, 2004) address the issue of the …scal burden associated with immigrants in a pay-as-you-go …scal system. They show that the additional …scal burden could be shifted forward inde…nitely, and all cohorts of the native born in the present and in the future could gain from the initial in ‡ux of unskilled migrants. 
A Proof
We …rst show that (1 )
which is true by assumption, equation (10) . Additionally, observe that: 
